The Fire Safety Engineering Group (FSEG) of the University of Greenwich in the UK is undertaking an international study into human factors associated with wayfinding and the interpretation of wayfinding signage.

As part of this study, FSEG have prepared an on-line questionnaire designed to help us understand how different people wayfind i.e. find their way through buildings in normal and emergency conditions. We would like as many people as possible to complete the survey, and anyone can complete the survey.

Your participation in these studies will contribute to improving our understanding of human behaviour and ultimately contribute to the design of more user friendly and safer buildings.

Please get as many of your family, friends and colleagues to complete the survey.

Thank you for your assistance.

You can find the survey on our web site at: http://fseg.gre.ac.uk/whichway/

The FSEG YOUTUBE channel has just passed a major milestone – over 200,000 video views of FSEG featured fire research output! This has been achieved with a presence of just under 3 years on YOUTUBE – Well done to the FSEG team!

http://www.youtube.com/FSEGresearch/

Announcing a 1 day seminar at the Royal Institution of Naval Architects concerned with Passenger Ship Evacuation presenting the results of the SAFEGUARD project.

SAFEGUARD, a 3.5 year (April 2009 – Dec 2012) EU FP7 project focusing on issues associated with the evacuation of large passenger ships, has generated more comprehensive passenger evacuation data than any other single evacuation project in history!  The project involved:

- Three passenger ships:

• Superspeed1, Jewel of the Seas, Olympia Palace.

Superspeed 1

Olympia Palace

Jewel of the Seas

- Five semi-unannounced assembly trials, at sea involving:

• 5,600 passengers successfully and safely assembled.
• 5,000 infra-red tags issued to passengers
• 100 Gb of video data collected from 246 video cameras
• 3000 passenger questionnaires collected.
• The assembly trial on the Jewel of the Seas involved 2304 passengers, making it the largest fully monitored assembly trial ever conducted at sea. 

Assembly on the Jewel of the Seas

-  Three ship evacuation models:

• maritimeEXODUS, EVI, ODIGO.

-  9 research partners:

• 2 Universities: University of Greenwich (UK) and the Memorial University (Canada)
• 4 engineering consultancy firms: BMT (UK), Bureau Veritas (France), Principia (France), Safety @ Sea (UK).
• 3 Shipping Lines: Color Line Marine AS (Norway), Royal Caribbean International (Finland), Minoan Lines Shipping SA (Greece).

FSEG and other project partners will be presenting the main findings from project SAFEGUARD at a 1 day seminar at the Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA) Head Quarters in central London.  The seminar will address the following key questions:

• Do we really know that cruise ships and passenger ferries can safely evacuate passengers in an emergency?
• How do “real” passengers actually react in an evacuation?
• Can we be certain that the current passenger evacuation simulation software is realistic?
• How can we improve current IMO guidelines concerning the assessment of ship evacuation capabilities?

The seminar will present the work of SAFEGUARD and discuss suggested modifications to the IMO MSC Circ 1238 arising from the project.

The content of the seminar is as follows:

• Background on ship evacuation issues.
• Introduction to the SAFEGUARD project, methodology, description of the three shipping companies and the ships investigated.
• Enhanced Benchmark Scenarios and model performance and recommendations to IMO MSC.
• Response time data set: data collection, the data sets, implications to IMO MSC.
• Validation data sets: data collection, the data sets, the model performances, and the recommendations to IMO MSC.
• Heel Benchmark: Rationale, the benchmark, the model performances and the recommendations to IMO MSC.
• Fire Benchmark: Rationale, the benchmark, the model performances and the recommendations to IMO MSC.

Places are limited, so it is recommended that you register early.  Full details and online registration can be found at the RINA web site at:

http://www.rina.org.uk/Passenger-Evacuation-Seminar.

SEMINAR DATE: 30 November 2012

SEMINAR LOCATION: RINA Head Quarters; 10 Upper Belgrave Street; London SW1X 8BQ; UK

Given the recent UK government advice concerning storing petrol at home it is worth reviewing the legal and safety advice related to domestic storage of flammable fuels.

The storage of petrol or diesel at home is potentially a very dangerous practice.  If you do feel the need to store fuel at home it should be kept in a detached garage or shed.  The reason is obvious, if you have a fire in your house the fire can be accelerated by stored fuels.   Leaking fuels can also cause a fire so its best if it is not kept in living spaces. 

The law allows you to store a maximum of 15 litres of petrol in no more than two approved metal containers, or ten litres in two plastic containers. Neither plastic container should be of more than five litres’ capacity.  Approved containers are marked and approved for petrol storage and fitted with a secure cap to prevent leakage of liquid and fuel vapours.

Fuel can only be stored in a secured, locked shed or a garage. Garages should be detached from the house or separated by a fire door if it is adjoining. Fuel MUST not be stored within any living areas of your house.

Be smart and keep safe.

In the closing days of March, the UK print and electronic media are full of stories of panic petrol buying by members of the public fearful of a possible petrol delivery drivers’ strike only days before the traditional Easter getaway.    Was the behaviour of the public an example of large scale panic, or simply a rational response to government messaging?

A key interview that sparked much of the public behaviour was given by Francis Maude, a UK Cabinet Office minister, to SKY NEWS on the 28 March 2012.  You can find the interview on YOUTUBE at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYqxBmtOkvM

Francis Maude, who has been chairing meetings with government colleagues to plan the government response to the threatened strike, made the following comments outside Number 10 Downing Street:

 “….to the extent that people can get some petrol in their cars some fuel in their cars, as and when, no desperate hurry, because as I say the union hasn’t given notice and they have to give seven days notice, that is going to help.”

The minister made it clear that the strike had not yet been called, and that there would need to be seven days notice of a strike.  However, he also made the point that it would be a good idea for the public to get some petrol in their cars.  This is clearly a message to the public that it would be a good idea to ensure that their cars were topped up with fuel.  He went on to say,

“All we can say is that we need to make sure people know this is happening; it’s up to people to make their own decisions; there is no need for rushing around in a mad dash, this is not about to happen tomorrow.”

The minister reiterates that the potential strike is not going to happen in the next day or so, thereby informing the public that there is no immediate threat, but then goes on to say,

“….as and when, when it makes sense a bit of extra fuel in the jerry can in the garage is a sensible precaution to take.”

Fill those jerry cans - just doing what the minister suggested.

Following government advice

Here the minister directly contradicts himself by encouraging the public, not only to make sure that they have topped up their cars with fuel, but to stock-pile petrol in their garages, even though there is no immediate threat of a strike taking place in the next seven days.  The storage of petrol by the general public in their garages is not normal behaviour.  Indeed, it is very unsafe behaviour, which is discouraged by fire and rescue services as domestic fires fuelled by petrol can become extremely dangerous.  However, despite there being no immediate threat of a strike and hence shortage of petrol for the next seven days, the minister is encouraging the public to stock-pile petrol supplies at their homes.  The minister attempted to clarify the government’s position by adding:

“People need to make their own decision, all we can do is make sure they know what is potentially in the offing, we hope the strike won’t happen …but we do want the public to be aware that there is a risk and that we are making contingency plans to keep essential and emergency services going, and we think that the public should be aware of this risk so that in the ordinary course of their business they can take what ever steps, everyone chooses and takes responsibility for themselves; that’s all we can do.  We are not advising people that they should do this or that, we are pointing out what the possibilities are and pointing out things that they might chose to do if they want to…”

So the message to the public was that your course of action is up to you.  However, in this context, a senior government minister, standing outside Number 10, is a highly authoritative source of advice likely to have influence with the public and it was made clear that the government were already taking measures to ensure that their vehicles would be able to function during a potential strike.  Furthermore, the actions that the public can take to prepare for the strike, should it happen are, top up your cars and stock-pile petrol at home in your garage!

Panic or following instructions?

The messaging from this senior government official, while admittedly not clear, strongly suggested a course of action that the public should follow.   On the one hand the government does not want to be responsible for the actions taken by the public, while on the other hand the government is providing thinly veiled advice to top-up and stock-pile.

If we now put this situation into the context of the upcoming Easter four-day weekend – nine days away at the time – is it little wonder that the public queued at petrol stations to fill up their fuel tanks and jerry cans?   I would not describe this as panic buying, but a rational response to a senior government minister’s advice.   The situation is also self perpetuating, as members of the public see people queuing for fuel, and the media report of petrol stations going dry, more and more people are encouraged to queue for fuel.   This is not panic, but a rationale response to government messaging fuelled by behavioural feedback.

This is yet another example of the incorrect usage of the word ‘panic’ by the media and the public.  It is also an example of the power and importance of messaging in potential crisis situations.  This situation demonstrates what can be achieved by messaging, and how it is possible for an authoritative source to influence the behaviour of the public through messaging.   The challenge is to be clear about your communication objectives and get the messaging, messenger and timing right to achieve them. 

Messaging can also be a powerful tool in accident and disaster management.  In voice-based building fire alarm systems, the correct messaging – again from an authoritative source – can decrease occupant response times, encouraging occupants to start their evacuation.  In large-scale disaster situations, messaging can be used to positively influence the public’s behaviour in ways that may appear to be counter intuitive e.g. advice to seek shelter when the natural response would be to evacuate or visa versa.

Did the messaging provided by Francis Maude achieve the government’s objectives? To answer this question it is essential to know what those objectives were.  I’ll leave it to the politically-minded to decide.

As in most disasters of this type, so soon after the incident, information concerning the nature of this incident is far too sketchy to draw any firm conclusions.  Indeed, at the time of writing there are more questions than answers.  In my next few blogs I would like to make a few general comments related to issues associated with ship evacuation, and based on media accounts, attempt to put together a picture of what we currently know.  Finally, I would like to make some tentative comments about the incident and its repercussions for passenger ship safety.  

In the third and final blog in this series I want to raise some questions about the Costa Concordia incident and discuss the repercussions for passenger ship safety.

1) This incident shows that a disaster can happen hours after a ship leaves port. So should the mandatory assembly drill be completed prior to leaving port rather than having the option of doing it within 24 hours of embarkation? 

The Costa Concordia disaster couldn’t have happened at a worse time.  Most if not all of the passengers who boarded at Civitavecchia would have been new to the ship.  It takes passengers some time to get accustomed to the layout of a large cruise ship.  It may take days before the passengers know their way around.  Even figuring out if you are walking forward (towards the front) or aft (towards the rear) of the ship when in one of the long corridors can be difficult.  On top of this, not having experienced the emergency assembly drill means that new passengers (especially those new to cruise ships) would not know what the process was to abandon ship and that there was an assembly phase, what the signal was to commence the assembly phase, where their assembly station was located, where their lifejacket was kept and how to don their lifejacket.  All of this will add to the confusion associated with the assembly process.  Not having conducted the assembly drill prior to leaving port is likely to have contributed to the reported confusion during the evacuation of the Costa Concordia.  

In my opinion, the drill must be undertaken prior to leaving port.  IMO should review this requirement as soon as possible.

2) Given that there would have been other officers on the bridge of the Costa Concordia, why didn’t anyone stop the Captain from taking the ship off course and dangerously close to the Island of Gigilo? 

Is there an issue with the culture onboard ships that makes it impossible for junior officers to question the Captain’s decisions regarding the safety of the passengers and vessel?  A similar situation existed in aviation where first officers felt it was not appropriate to highlight potential problems with decisions made by the Captain which may impact the safety of the passengers and the aircraft.  This is believed to have contributed to several accidents in the past but the aviation industry, on the whole, has now addressed this problem.  

The aviation industry addressed the problem through the introduction of a process known as Crew Resource Management or CRM.  The process relies on the flight deck crew working as a team.  No single person has all the anwers and things can be overlooked by one person and picked up by another.  At the end of the day it is still up to the Captain to make the decision (on an aircraft or on a ship), but it is useful to have a helpful team that are not afraid to bring things to his/her attention.  It involves junior officers being prepared to :
State their concern
State the problem as they interpret it
Suggest a solution
Seek confirmation

Is there a problem with bridge culture on large passenger ships?  IMO should review the situation.

3) Assuming that the Channel 4 timeline is correct and there was 90 minutes between hitting the rocks and heeling over (see blog 2), could the Costa Concordia have been safely evacuated?  

With the ship upright, a calm and orderly assembly may have required 40 to 60 minutes.  With the abandonment process requiring 30 minutes in ideal conditions, all the passengers and crew could have abandoned the ship in 60 to 75 minutes.  This assumes that the call to abandon the ship is made at 30 to 45 minutes into the assembly process.  With 60 to 75 minutes estimated to be required to abandon the ship, the Captain had a 15 to 30 minute window in which to decide to start the assembly process. 

Taking the lower limit of these time estimations, the evacuation could have followed the following timeline:

  0 min – ship hits rock, Captain starts assembly phase

30 min – Captain starts abandonment phase

40 min – Assembly phase completed, 40 min after ship hits the rocks

60 min – Abandonment completed 30 min after the start of the abandonment phase.

This minimum timeline requires the Captain to start the assembly process immediately the ship struck the rocks and assumes that the assembly process is completed in the minimum practical time.

Taking the upper limit of these time estimations, the evacuation could have followed the following timeline:

 0 min – ship hits rock

15 min – Captain starts assembly phase

60 min – Captain starts abandonment phase

75 min – Assembly phase completed, 60 min after start of assembly phase

90 min – Abandonment completed, 30 min after the start of the abandonment phase.

On this basis it is conceivable that the ship could have been safely evacuated prior to it healing over.  But it would have required the Captain to have started the assembly process within 15 minutes of hitting the rocks and the abandonment phase within 60 minutes of hitting the rocks. 

4) It appears that it may have been possible to complete the evacuation before the ship started to heel over, so given the severity of the situation:

Why didn’t the Captain start the assembly phase earlier then he did?

While there is a lot going on in the initial minutes of such an incident, it would have been prudent for the Captain to have commenced a precautionary assembly as early as possible.  In general, there are many reasons why a Captain may hesitate in starting an assembly.  This is not an easy call; the last thing that a Captain and a ship owner wants is to ruin the first night and the first dinner of the cruise with a false alarm.  Imagine how upset the passengers and the ship owners would be if it turned out to be a false alarm or not as serious a situation as first thought!  What type of satisfaction ratings would the passengers give the Captain and crew if it were a false alarm?  What if a passenger was injured during a needless assembly?  Not an easy call, but with the safety of everyone on board at stake, it is a call that has to be made without fear of repercussions if wrong.  The safety culture of an organisation must reflect this type of approach.

5) As it appears to have been possible to complete the evacuation before the ship started to heel over, so given the severity of the situation:

Why didn’t the Captain start the abandonment phase earlier then he did?

It is noted that at this stage it is not even clear if the Captain did give the order to start the abandonment phase.  Nevertheless, according to the Channel 4 timeline, 73 minutes elapse between hitting the rocks and the command to abandon ship. From the media accounts, passengers who had assembled with their lifejackets were waiting to board the lifeboats.  Clearly, passengers were ready to board the lifeboats much earlier in the evacuation sequence. Doubtless, this delay contributed to the unrest reported by some passengers in the assembly area.  The delay in issuing the order to abandon ship will have made the job of the crew in the assembly areas significantly more difficult then it needed to be.  It also possibly contributed to the reported criticism of the crew in the assembly areas, by passengers who blamed the crew for delaying the abandonment process.  

6) The crew on the Costa Concordia had a tough job managing the assembly and abandonment process, a job made all the tougher by the delay in starting the evacuation process.  How can crew be better trained in handling the assembly process?

The crew undergo training in the assembly process usually without passengers present.  This is to ensure that they know where to go and what their duties are.  In addition, crew take part in the mandatory assembly drill for passengers, usually prior to departure.  While this is primarily a training event for the passengers, the crew also get to interact with passengers during a mass assembly process and so they get to experience what it may be like in an ideal evacuation.  However, the process could be made more realistic by having an unannounced drill – where the passengers and crew do not know when the drill will take place. 

As mentioned in blog 1 of this series, FSEG, my research group, are involved in an EU FP7 project called SAFEGUARD (see paper 252 at http://fseg.gre.ac.uk/fire/pub.asp).  As part of project SAFEGUARD we have performed five semi-unannounced ship assemblies at sea.  We wanted the assembly drill to be a surprise to the passengers and crew so that it would more closely resemble a real situation.  While the passengers knew that they would participate in an unannounced assembly drill after they had left port, they did not know when this would occur.  We had a lot of opposition from the industry at first.  The main issue that was raised was that the trial we proposed would be no different from what they normally do i.e. the announced drill along side and so would not produce anything that was not already well known.  They essentially wanted us to base our analysis on the normal assembly trials.  This is clearly nonsense since in the normal assembly drill, passengers are warned in advance of the exact timing of the assembly drill.  The passengers are even reminded 10 minutes before the drill takes place that the drill will start soon. As a result, many passengers pre-empt the drill and collect lifejackets and head off to the assembly stations prior to the commencement of the drill.  Anyone who has experienced a cruise will know precisely what I mean.  

As a result, many of the people are either already in the assembly station or in their cabins waiting for the drill to start.  While the passengers still have to find the assembly station, they do not experience an assembly with all the passengers trying to find their cabins and their assembly station at the same time.  So they do not experience the levels of congestion and organised chaos this produces – an experience not too dissimilar to what may occur in a real emergency assembly in ideal conditions.  Perhaps of more importance, the crew do not experience these conditions.  I am happy to say that we did eventually find three ship companies that were prepared to get involved and run the unannounced drills.  Without exception, the assembly process took considerably longer than is usually experienced when done alongside.  In most cases the assembly times produced by the unannounced drills at sea took about twice as long as the announced alongside drills.  Also, the ships officers and crew were particularly appreciative of the experience as they had never experienced anything like it before, in particular the numbers of passengers all moving at the same time, not knowing where to go, requiring guidance, it really put their training and their procedures to the test.  Without exception, everyone involved learnt some valuable lessons about the assembly process and what they may face in a real emergency assembly. 

It would not be practical or desirable for a cruise ship to run all their standard assembly drills as unannounced drills.   However, given the added training value it offers, it may be useful to require cruise ships to run some of their drills using this approach.  I suggest that IMO should consider making running a limited number of unannounced drills mandatory for cruise ship operators.

7) Should the IMO MSC Circ 1238 evacuation benchmark scenarios be more demanding?

Project SAFEGUARD (see item 6) is aimed at improving the current evacuation analysis process used to certify large passenger ships.  As part of this process it is conducting unannounced assembly trials at sea to collect more realistic data to utilise in the certification analysis such as the response times of passengers i.e. how long it takes passengers to react to the call to assemble.  In addition, SAFEGUARD is also collecting full assembly time data which will be used to validate and test the software tools used to simulate ship evacuation.  Perhaps of greater interest, SAFEGUARD is developing additional challenging benchmark scenarios to be investigated as part of the evacuation certification process.  These include a fire scenario and a scenario involving heel. Both fire and heel are serious hazards during ship evacuation and are currently excluded from the certification evacuation analysis.  By the time project SAFEGUARD is due to be completed (December 2012) it is hoped that several position papers will be produced and submitted to IMO for their consideration.

Why did the Costa Concordia heel over to the starboard side revealing the gash on the port side of the vessel?

I am not a naval architect but I am somewhat puzzled as to how the Costa Concordia has ended up.  The gash to her side is on the port side of the vessel.  So she would have been taking on water on her port side causing the ship to heel to the port side and eventually overturn onto her port side.  However she has overturned onto the starboard side revealing the gash on the port side.  How did this happen?  Was it the result of actions of the crew who tried to flood the starboard side to keep the ship in balance, was it the action of beaching, or was she holed again during the beaching, this time on her starboard side?  

Hopefully the inquiry into this incident will reveal what happened and why it happened.  It’s a little too easy to simply heap the blame on one individual.  It is hoped that from this tragic incident lessons will be learned that will lead to the improved safety of those who take to the sea.

As in most disasters of this type, so soon after the incident, information concerning the nature of this incident is far too sketchy to draw any firm conclusions.  Indeed, at the time of writing there are more questions than answers.  In my next few blogs I would like to make a few general comments related to issues associated with ship evacuation, and based on media accounts, attempt to put together a picture of what we currently know.  Finally, I would like to make some tentative comments about the incident and its repercussions for passenger ship safety.   In the second blog I want to discuss what we currently know about the Costa Concordia incident based on media accounts.

The world’s media has been flooded with accounts concerning the Costa Concordia. 

We know that the Costa Concordia left the port of Civitavecchia (just north of Rome) at 19:00.  The assembly drill had not been done and was planed for 17:00 the following day – within SOLAS requirements.  Also, the ship already had an undisclosed number of passengers onboard who were continuing on the cruise when she came into Civitavecchia and so these passengers would have already had the assembly drill.  In total it has been reported that there were 3206 passengers on board and 1023 crew, making a total of 4229 people on board.  We also know that the ship did not follow its pre-programmed route but was diverted to pass close by the Island of Giglio.  At this point in time it is not clear why the ship was diverted, but it appears to have been at the command of the Captain who wanted to “salute” a retired colleague on the Island.

From here on, things get confused.  According to one account:

“……Mr Ebbage, also 68, added: “Suddenly, around 9.30 pm, there was an almighty bang. Our table went flying, everything crashed to the floor and the lights went out…..”

From: Italy cruise ship disaster: survivors describe ‘pure chaos’, The Telegraph, 15 January 2012

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9016776/Italy-cruise-ship-disaster-survivors-describe-pure-chaos.html

There are many similar survivor accounts in the media.  As we all know, the Costa Concordia hits an outcrop of rocks which cuts a 50m gash into her side.  However, it is not clear at what time this occurred.  This account suggests it was 21:30.   However, the severity of the impact is unmistakable from this account and other similar accounts.  What is clear is that at around 21:30 everyone onboard was plainly aware that something very significant had happened to the ship.  At this stage we would hope that the Captain was also aware that something was very seriously wrong. 

Determining an incident timeline is essential if we are to understand what happened during this incident.  However, it is very difficult to put the survivor accounts published by the media together into a coherent sequence of events as most of the interviews with survivors fail to provide an indication of when the reported events occurred.  This makes it very difficult to put an incident timeline together.  A couple of media outlets have attempted to put timelines together.  One timeline was put together by the National Post on 15 January.  An extract from this timeline is as follows:

21:30 – The ship strikes an outcropping.

21:35 – The electricity goes off.

21:45 – A first alarm is sounded: two long whistles and one short, informing the crew of a problem.

21:50 – The ship begins to list. In the restaurants, dinnerware falls off the tables. Some passengers rush to their cabins for their life vests.

22:00 – Some passengers begin gathering on the fourth deck where the lifeboats are located, as the captain tries to maneuver the vessel closer to shore.

22:10 – The “abandon ship” signal is given: seven short whistles and one long. Lifeboats begin their deployment.

22:20 – The coastguard launches rescue operations with the help of speedboats and helicopters.

23:15: The first lifeboat reaches Giglio. In all, some 4,000 of the ship’s 4,229 make it to safety aboard a lifeboat.

From: “The Costa Concordia’s final moments caught on camera”, National Post, 15 Jan 2012.

http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/01/15/timeline-the-costa-concordias-last-minutes/

The UK television programme, Channel 4 News have put together a timeline and broadcast it on their 19:00 programme on the 19 January 2012.  According to this timeline we have the following events:

21:45   – Costa Concordia hit the rocks and continued on its way.

21:52   – Costa Concordia starts to turn towards shore.

21:58   – Costa Concordia loses power and the coastguard, alerted by the family of a passenger, begins their rescue operation.

22:42   – Costa Concordia stops, evacuation starts and people begin to get into lifeboats.

22:58   – Abandon ship call is made

23:15   – Costa Concordia begins to heel over. 

There is clearly some confusion as to when the incident started and the timing of how it progressed.  However, we know that about 3900 people made it to shore in lifeboats and that about 300 people were left onboard as the ship heeled over.

According to the Channel 4 timeline there was some 90 minutes between hitting the rock and the point where it was impossible to launch the lifeboats.  It is inconceivable that the Captain was not aware very early on in the incident that his ship was holed and taking on water.

As in most disasters of this type, so soon after the incident, information concerning the nature of this incident is far too sketchy to draw any firm conclusions.  Indeed, at the time of writing there are more questions than answers.  In my next few blogs I would like to make a few general comments related to issues associated with ship evacuation, and based on media accounts, attempt to put together a picture of what we currently know.  Finally, I would like to make some tentative comments about the incident and its repercussions for passenger ship safety.   In the first blog I want to discuss the ship evacuation process.

Evacuating a large passenger ship, even in ideal conditions, is a complex and dangerous task.  Large passenger ships are normally evacuated in a two phase process, first the assembly phase and then the abandonment phase.  Each phase of the evacuation is initiated by a command from the Master of the vessel i.e. the Captain. 

 a) Assembly Phase

On the command of the Captain, usually designated by seven short and one long blast on the ships horn, the assembly phase can commence.  In the assembly phase, passengers are instructed by the crew to go to their designated assembly station, this is usually designated by a letter e.g. A, B, C, etc.  The assembly stations are usually spread over one or two decks and can be indoors (the norm) but can also be out doors (not so common).  How the ship conducts the assembly process is down to the company operating the ship and the Captain and so may differ from ship to ship.  For example, some ship operating companies assemble passengers by sending them direct to their designated assembly stations where they will be issued with life jackets.  Other ship operating companies will assemble passengers by first sending them to their cabins to collect life jackets, warm clothing and any essential medication, from their cabin, the passengers then make for their designated assembly station. 

During the assembly phase, crew should be stationed at key locations throughout the vessel to help direct passengers to their cabin and/or assembly station.  Once in the assembly station, passengers will don their lifejackets, or have lifejackets issued to them by the crew assigned to the assembly station. 

How long should the assembly process take?  As part of the ship design process, the duration of the assembly phase is determined through computer simulation, using evacuation simulation software such as maritimeEXODUS (see http://fseg.gre.ac.uk/exodus/air.html#maritime).  The maximum time for the assembly process determined by computer simulation for a ship the size of the Costa Concordia, as set out in IMO MSC circ 1238, is 48 minutes.  It should be noted that according to IMO MSC circ 1238, the simulation of the assembly process is intended to benchmark the evacuation capability of the ship and so an ideal benchmark scenario is used in the assessment.  The benchmark scenarios currently used assume that the ship is in an upright condition and in dead calm conditions.  A safety factor of 25% is added to the predicted time to take account of all the factors that are missed out in ideal benchmark scenario, such as fire and heel and the inherent simplifications in the simulation software. So in reality it should take no more than 1 hour to assemble a ship the size of the Costa Concordia.

My research group (FSEG) is part of an EU FP7 project called SAFEGUARD (see paper 252 at http://fseg.gre.ac.uk/fire/pub.asp).  As part of project SAFEGUARD we have performed five semi-unannounced ship assemblies at sea (not along side as is usual practice for the ship assembly drill).  One of these assemblies was on a ship of roughly similar size to the Costa Concordia but with fewer passengers.  The assembly time for this ship took was about 30 minutes – in ideal conditions but unannounced.   So if the assembly process had started before the ship had taken on a severe heel, I estimate that it should be possible to assemble the Costa Concordia passengers in about 40 to 60 minutes.

b) Abandonment Phase

On the command of the Captain, the abandonment phase can commence.  Starting the abandonment phase is not taken lightly, as boarding and lowering lifeboats filled with people, even in ideal situations, is not a trivial task and one with its own inherent dangers.  This is why it is the Captain who gives the command to commence the abandonment phase.  Furthermore, the abandonment phase can commence before all the passengers have assembled if necessary.  As with the assembly phase, the manner in which the ship conducts the abandonment phase is not set down in regulation, but each shipping company will have its own procedures.  Some companies may board those in greatest need first, perhaps the injured.  Others will board people in no particular order, just simply the order in which they turn up.  From the assembly station a member of the crew assigned to the assembly station will take a group of passengers to the lifeboat and will assist them to board the lifeboat, there will usually be a member of the crew already in the lifeboat to assist passengers as they board.  Large modern lifeboats have a capacity of up to 150 passengers.  Even larger lifeboats with twice the capacity are used on the super large cruise ships. Once the lifeboat is fully loaded, the crew assigned to the boat station will lower the lifeboat and once in the water it is expected to move away from the ship.  However, if the ships angle of heel is greater than 20 degrees, the lifeboats cannot be launched.  Lifeboats are normally lowered into the water only when the ship has come to a full stop.

The entire process of boarding all the passengers into the lifeboats and launching all the lifeboats should take no more than 30 minutes according to IMO SOLAS regulations.

c) Assembly Drills

Assembly drills are mandatory on any passenger ship which undertakes a journey of more than 24 hours.  According to IMO SOLAS regulations, the drill must be undertaken within 24 hours of passenger embarkation.

d) Lifeboats and Lifejackets

Under IMO SOLAS regulations, modern large passenger ships must have lifeboat and liferaft capacity for 125% of the people on board.  There must also be lifejackets for 105% of the people on board.  Lifeboats cannot be launched once the angle of heel exceeds 20 degrees and lifeboats cannot be launched while the ship is still underway.

e) Crew

Most of the ships crew, including waiters, entertainers, bar staff and cabin attendants will have a role in the evacuation process.  They will be positioned at key locations throughout the ship to direct passengers to their cabins and assembly stations, they will be in the assembly stations to manage the passengers, they will be at the lifeboats to assist the boarding of the lifeboats, they will control the lowering of the lifeboats and they will be in the lifeboats to control the lifeboats.   In addition to the assembly drills, which are also a form of training for the crew, the crew will have assembly drill training (without passengers ensuring that they know where to go) and lifeboat drills were they practice releasing and lowering the lifeboats.  Training sessions for crew must occur on a weekly basis, and each member of the crew must undergo training at least once per month (according to SOLAS regulations).

f) Women and Children First

There are no IMO regulations that states women and children must be given preference in boarding lifeboats.  It is not clear where this code of practice originates, but it is suggested to have arisen out of the sinking of HMS Birkenhead in 1852.  The Birkenhead was carrying troops to South Africa when she struck an uncharted rock and started to sink.  The soldiers commanding officer gave the order for the soldiers on board to stand firm and let the women and children, of which there where seven women and 13 children, board the two lifeboats that had successfully been launched.  The soldiers did as they were told and most perished.  The bravery of the Birkenhead soldiers is remembered in the Rudyard Kipling poem (1896) “Soldier an’ Sailor Too”:  

“To stand and be still

To the Birken’ead drill

Is a damn tough bullet to chew.”

The Titanic disaster of 1912 was another example where the “women and children first” tradition was upheld.  The combination of insufficient lifeboats and the Birkenhead tradition, meant that disproportionally more men then women died in this disaster. 

The concept of “Women and children first” is not mandated and it is not necessarily such a good idea.  Most emergency evacuation situations are characterised as being time critical.  In such situations every second counts and can literately make the difference between life and death.   In ship based disasters, the quicker you can get the lifeboats loaded and launched the better.  If you had to prioritise people at the boarding stage this is simply going to waste precious time and may delay the launching of the lifeboats.  Furthermore, family groups have very strong emotional and social bonds.  It is difficult to break these bonds.  To separate a family group on the basis of gender (the men folk being left behind) at the point of boarding the lifeboat would not be easy and is likely to be met with opposition, again delaying the boarding process.

Perhaps Somerset Maugham was a little ahead of his time concerning the position he took on the “Women and Children First” tradition.  He is quoted as once saying:

“I much prefer travelling in non-British ships.

There’s none of that nonsense about women and children first”

If you would like to know more about this, try listening to my BBC Radio 4 Women’s Hour (17/01/12 10:00am) interview from http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b019f9h9#p00n9wlf.

Also check out the Guardian website article, “Costa Concordia: are women still prioritised over men in evacuation procedures?” at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/reality-check-with-polly-curtis/2012/jan/16/costa-concordia-women?newsfeed=true 

g) Panic

I am not going to say anymore about panic, but I refer you to:

• The BBC Radio 4 “Today programme” interview I gave with Dr Drury on the 17 January 2012 at 07:41 http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9679000/9679490.stm
• An interview I gave for BBC NEWS on the 16 January in the article, “Costa Concordia: The rules of evacuating a ship”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16576289
• My blog on the Love Parade 24 July 2010.

I hope that the rescue divers have searched the lifts/elevators onboard the Costa Concordia. It is not clear when the power went out, and the ship did rapidly heel over so there may have been passengers trapped in the lifts/elevators.

I would like to express my deepest sympathies to the families and loved ones of the 11 confirmed dead and the 21 still missing in the tragic incident on the Costa Concordia off the Island of Giglio on the 13 January 2012. My best wishes also go out to the many injured and traumatised in the incident. I would also like to commend those members of the crew of the Costa Concordia who assisted passengers, under extremely difficult conditions, during the assembly and abandonment phases of the evacuation. The fact that so many lifeboats were launched at all and so many lives were saved is testimony to their actions. Thanks and praise should also be heaped on the Italian Coastguard and Fire Fighters who assisted in the rescue of hundreds of passengers and crew stranded on the Costa Concordia after she heeled over to almost 90 degrees and who are still putting themselves in harm’s way, searching the flooded interior of the stricken vessel in the hope of finding survivors. Finally, we must not forget the 1500 inhabitants of the Island of Giglio, who comforted and supported the 4000+ survivors of the Costa Concordia into the night and early hours of the morning on the 13th and 14th of January.

As in most disasters of this type, so soon after the incident, information concerning the nature of this incident is far too sketchy to draw any firm conclusions. Indeed, at the time of writing there are more questions than answers. Hopefully the inquiry into this incident will reveal what happened and why it happened. It is hoped that from this tragic incident lessons will be learned that will lead to the improved safety of those who take to the sea.