In the Rhode Island case, fire works started by the band set alight PU foam which was used as sound proofing cladding on the walls.  The PU rapidly burnt producing thick choking smoke, laden with deadly Carbon Monoxide gas and Hydrogen Cyanide gas.  People were rapidly overcome by the toxic gases and the rapid resulting flashover.  Coupled fire and evacuation computer simulations of the Rhode Island nightclub fire produced by FSEG suggest that after approximately 100 seconds from ignition, around 100 people would be dead due to the inhalation of toxic fire gases and the effects of flashover.  In the Rhode Island case, while the club was full, it was within legal limits and the nightclub had four exits (including the main exit), but the majority of the patrons tried to use the main entrance, the exit that they used to come into the club.

Media accounts are suggesting that between 300 and 2000 people were in the Kiss Nightclub at the time of the fire.  It is also not clear how many exits the nightclub had, media reports suggest that the nightclub had only one emergency exit and that fire fighters had to make a hole in the wall to assist people to escape.  As the Rhode Island Nightclub fire demonstrated, fires in such environments, fuelled by PU foam will spread extremely rapidly producing large amounts of highly toxic gases, providing people in the crowed venue little time to get out.

If the reports in the media are correct, then it is surprising that only 180 people have lost their lives.  I would not be surprised if the death toll rises, especially if the occupancy is more than 300.  Large crowds, within a confined space, whose walls are clad with combustible PU foam, with limited means of egress, probably in the dark, a number of who are probably intoxicated and then allowing the use of pyrotechnics is a recipe for disaster.   Indeed, building regulations and planning permission should not permit such death traps to exist in the first place and enforcement authorities should ensure that they do not occur.

Once the blame game starts, I hope that the bereaved families do not simply point their finger at the nightclub owner but look beyond this, to their local government authorities that have responsibility for planning permission and building control and to enforcement authorities that have responsibility for inspecting premises.  It is too easy to simply blame the owner.  More importantly, to do so will simply allow this type of tragedy to happen again and again.

Furthermore, while this type of disaster can happen anywhere in the world, and it has — USA, Russia, China and Argentina to name just four recent disasters – it is to be hoped that a country with the responsibility of hosting the next Football World Cup and the Olympics, will ensure that their building regulations and the enforcement of those regulations are fit for purpose.   Not simply for the new build stadia, but for all the existing hotels, transportation hubs and entertainment venues that will be enjoyed by millions of tourists from around the world.

Finally, I wonder how long it is going to take before the media, and local government officials begin to attribute “panic” as a contributory factor in this tragedy, conveniently diverting attention from other potential systemic failures.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 

Rhode Island Fire Simulation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o197yeup1BQ&list=PLC82636C7790DE890&index=1

Rhode Island Coupled Fire and Evacuation simulation:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gmPOIriMiyU&list=PL482FD999D5793B82&index=1

Paper describing simulations: http://fseg.gre.ac.uk/fire/pub.asp

Paper 223. “Coupled Fire/Evacuation Analysis of the Station Nightclub Fire”. Galea E.R., Wang, Z., Veeraswamy, A., Jia, F.,Lawrence, P., and Ewer, J. Proceedings of 9th IAFSS SymposiumKarlsruhe,Germany, 2008, ISNN 1817-4299, pp 465-476. DOI:10.3801/IAFSS.FSS.9-465

LINKS TO NEWS ABOUT THIS INCIDENT:

SKY NEWS: Brazil Nightclub Fire Tragedy: 180 Killed.

http://news.sky.com/story/1043501/brazil-nightclub-fire-tragedy-180-killed

The Independent: ‘At least 180 killed’ inBrazilnightclub fire after pyrotechnics set sound-proofing alight

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/at-least-180-killed-in-brazil-nightclub-fire-after-pyrotechnics-set-soundproofing-alight-8468600.html

 The BBC headline on their website for this story states,

 Glasgow Airport evacuation: Passenger tells of panic on Jet2 plane

 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-20001291

Is this a fair account of the situation on board the Jet2 aircraft?  Were people really behaving irrationally and in a selfish manner during this evacuation?  Had social norms broken down, was it everyone for themselves?  Or is this just another media exaggeration to sensationalise a story?

Other media accounts had more factual headlines, such as from the Express web site:

17 Injured as plane is evacuated at Glasgow Airport after smoke alert.

http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/353053/17-injured-as-plane-is-evacuated-at-Glasgow-Airport-after-smoke-alert

From the Telegraph web site we have:

Glasgow Airport Seventeen injured as aircraft aborts take off

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/aviation/9619600/Glasgow-Airport-Seventeen-injured-as-aircraft-aborts-take-off.html

From the Mail Online web site we have:

20 crew and passengers are INJURED in emergency evacuation by inflatable slides from jet at Glasgow airport after “engine” fills cabin with smoke.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2220041/17-injured-crew-passengers-evacuated-plane-Glasgow-Airport.html?ITO=1490

Evacuating an aircraft is not something that people do every day, and so it is going to be an unusual experience for most people, and a frightening experience for most, especially if you believe, as these people must have, that a fire had started on board.  All 189 passengers will also have to exit the aircraft in an awful hurry and in an unusual and physical manner i.e. jumping onto slides or climbing out of the overwing exit, onto the wing and then jump to the ground.  The cabin crew will have been yelling at the passengers to evacuate, leave your bags, jump onto the slide, while the cabin was filling with acrid smoke.  The passengers on board would have been a mix of people including;  men, women, children, the elderly, family groups and possibly disabled people.  They would have had a range of flying experience from frequent flyers to the ocassional  flyer.  Given this mix of people we would not expect everyone to react in the same way, and not everyone will react without emotion.  But will panic really break out in this situation, will it be everyone for themselves, as the BBC headline suggests?

The opening sentence of the BBC article may give this impression,

 “Passengers on an Alicante-bound plane from Glasgow Airport have described “sheer panic” after “swirling” smoke in the cabin forced an emergency stop.” 

So what do the BBC base this on?  A quote from one passenger was reported as,

“… passenger X said “people started running” as the pilot of the Jet2 737 shouted “get out, get out” following the emergency stop at 07:40.”….”

Well this seems quite normal given the situation, who wouldn’t be trying to run out of an aircraft filling with smoke with the captain and cabin crew yelling at you to get out!  Indeed, you would be in a panicked state if you just froze on the spot and didn’t do anything — this is called negative panic or behavioural inaction.  It is a normal behaviour to try and get out of the aircraft as quickly as possible, especially if the captain and cabin crew are yelling at you to get out!

The BBC inform us that one passenger was travelling with his young family and report the passenger as saying, 

 “I have a nine-week-old daughter and a four-year-old daughter. I had my nine-week-old attached to my chest as I went down the emergency chute and my wife had our four-year-old and was in tears. ……. It was just sheer panic, something no-one would want to go through again.”

Clearly this situation is extremely frightening and traumatic, especially if you have a wife, child and infant to look after, make your way to the emergency exit and then jump onto a slide — all while the other 185 passengers are trying to get out and the aircraft is filling with smoke.  It is not surprising that there were tears and it is not surprising that they would have been extremely anxious and would have had adrenaline pumping.  But the behaviour of this family does not sound like a panic behaviour.  They kept together and assisted each other out of the aircraft.  Their behaviour sounds like a rational response to the extra ordinary situation that they found themselves in.  While the passenger uses the “P” word in his description it would have been helpful had the journalist gone on to ask the passenger to describe the scenes of panic that he reported.  Often people will use the “P” word to describe people running away from danger, or people crying.  This does not indicate that people were behaving in an irrational manner or that social norms are ignored.

The BBC also selectively quote another passenger’s account in their article and also helpfully include a recording of the interview.  In the article the passenger is reported as saying,

“I was sitting in row 11 and I could smell smoke as we were accelerating hard. “I looked up. One or two passengers, including myself, had our reading light on and when I looked up to the lamps and the ceiling, I could actually see smoke swirling around and I thought, oops, there’s something not right here.  “We were accelerating very, very hard down the runway at this stage and I was about to scream out to the cabin crew when obviously the pilot realised there was something wrong and he immediately throttled the engines back and put the brakes on. “It’s the hardest braking I’ve ever experienced in my life.” 

This is where the BBC article leaves the interview.  This selective quotation fits into the tone of the story that is being told by the journalist, smoke filling the aircraft and the dramatic stop.  However, in the recorded interview, which is also available on the BBC website, the passenger goes on to say, but is not quoted in the article,

“….a few seconds later he gave the order to evacuate. Everybody got out of their seats, one or two passengers tried to reach into the overhead lockers to get their baggage but they were politely told in no uncertain Glaswegian terms just get out of the aircraft” both the journalist and the passenger laugh, “leave your bags and get out, but there was no panic”.

The passenger is describing an orderly behaviour and makes the observation that there was no panic.  This unfortunately does not fit into the tone of the article and so is not reported.  The journalist desperately tries to get back to possible stories of panic and extreme behaviour and goes onto to say,

“You are laughing about it now but that is probably not what you were feeling about it at the time.”

 The passenger (helpfully) responds,

 “..There was smoke coming off the right hand engine so I was going out the left overwing exit….we all wanted to get off as quickly as possible but it was all orderly, there was no panic.”

In describing his own behaviour the passenger paints a picture of rational behaviour, a clear thought process that lead him to select an appropriate exit.  He also describes the behaviour of others as being orderly and states that there was no panic.  Clearly this account does not fit with the tone of the article so it is not reported.  The journalist rather go with the easy story, the story that is going to make a sensationalist headline, the story that is in-line with the publics hollywood feed expectations when it comes to evacuation stories — people panic!

While these two accounts are not sufficient to base a judgement on the nature of the evacuation from the Jet2 aircraft, they certainly do not support the BBC headline or the tone of the BBC story.  I am sure that there were people screaming and crying during the evacuation, but this in itself is not an indication of panic behaviour.  Indeed, the accounts in the BBC story support the understanding built up over the past 30+ years that on the whole people do not tend to panic in emergency situations.  Indeed, quite the opposite, people tend to behave in a rational way and social norms are maintained even in the most extreme situations.

Unfortunately, this story simply perpetuates the myth that in emergency situations the norm is for people to panic.  I think that a more interesting, uplifting story is that in emergency situations people tend not to panic, but tend to behave in a rational supportive manner and are more likely to assist others then selfishly think only of themselves.

The Jet2 aircraft after the evacuation (picture from ITV website)

A key interview that sparked much of the public behaviour was given by Francis Maude, a UK Cabinet Office minister, to SKY NEWS on the 28 March 2012.  You can find the interview on YOUTUBE at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYqxBmtOkvM

Francis Maude, who has been chairing meetings with government colleagues to plan the government response to the threatened strike, made the following comments outside Number 10 Downing Street:

 “….to the extent that people can get some petrol in their cars some fuel in their cars, as and when, no desperate hurry, because as I say the union hasn’t given notice and they have to give seven days notice, that is going to help.”

The minister made it clear that the strike had not yet been called, and that there would need to be seven days notice of a strike.  However, he also made the point that it would be a good idea for the public to get some petrol in their cars.  This is clearly a message to the public that it would be a good idea to ensure that their cars were topped up with fuel.  He went on to say,

“All we can say is that we need to make sure people know this is happening; it’s up to people to make their own decisions; there is no need for rushing around in a mad dash, this is not about to happen tomorrow.”

The minister reiterates that the potential strike is not going to happen in the next day or so, thereby informing the public that there is no immediate threat, but then goes on to say,

“….as and when, when it makes sense a bit of extra fuel in the jerry can in the garage is a sensible precaution to take.”

Fill those jerry cans - just doing what the minister suggested.

Following government advice

Here the minister directly contradicts himself by encouraging the public, not only to make sure that they have topped up their cars with fuel, but to stock-pile petrol in their garages, even though there is no immediate threat of a strike taking place in the next seven days.  The storage of petrol by the general public in their garages is not normal behaviour.  Indeed, it is very unsafe behaviour, which is discouraged by fire and rescue services as domestic fires fuelled by petrol can become extremely dangerous.  However, despite there being no immediate threat of a strike and hence shortage of petrol for the next seven days, the minister is encouraging the public to stock-pile petrol supplies at their homes.  The minister attempted to clarify the government’s position by adding:

“People need to make their own decision, all we can do is make sure they know what is potentially in the offing, we hope the strike won’t happen …but we do want the public to be aware that there is a risk and that we are making contingency plans to keep essential and emergency services going, and we think that the public should be aware of this risk so that in the ordinary course of their business they can take what ever steps, everyone chooses and takes responsibility for themselves; that’s all we can do.  We are not advising people that they should do this or that, we are pointing out what the possibilities are and pointing out things that they might chose to do if they want to…”

So the message to the public was that your course of action is up to you.  However, in this context, a senior government minister, standing outside Number 10, is a highly authoritative source of advice likely to have influence with the public and it was made clear that the government were already taking measures to ensure that their vehicles would be able to function during a potential strike.  Furthermore, the actions that the public can take to prepare for the strike, should it happen are, top up your cars and stock-pile petrol at home in your garage!

Panic or following instructions?

The messaging from this senior government official, while admittedly not clear, strongly suggested a course of action that the public should follow.   On the one hand the government does not want to be responsible for the actions taken by the public, while on the other hand the government is providing thinly veiled advice to top-up and stock-pile.

If we now put this situation into the context of the upcoming Easter four-day weekend — nine days away at the time — is it little wonder that the public queued at petrol stations to fill up their fuel tanks and jerry cans?   I would not describe this as panic buying, but a rational response to a senior government minister’s advice.   The situation is also self perpetuating, as members of the public see people queuing for fuel, and the media report of petrol stations going dry, more and more people are encouraged to queue for fuel.   This is not panic, but a rationale response to government messaging fuelled by behavioural feedback.

This is yet another example of the incorrect usage of the word ‘panic’ by the media and the public.  It is also an example of the power and importance of messaging in potential crisis situations.  This situation demonstrates what can be achieved by messaging, and how it is possible for an authoritative source to influence the behaviour of the public through messaging.   The challenge is to be clear about your communication objectives and get the messaging, messenger and timing right to achieve them. 

Messaging can also be a powerful tool in accident and disaster management.  In voice-based building fire alarm systems, the correct messaging — again from an authoritative source — can decrease occupant response times, encouraging occupants to start their evacuation.  In large-scale disaster situations, messaging can be used to positively influence the public’s behaviour in ways that may appear to be counter intuitive e.g. advice to seek shelter when the natural response would be to evacuate or visa versa.

Did the messaging provided by Francis Maude achieve the government’s objectives? To answer this question it is essential to know what those objectives were.  I’ll leave it to the politically-minded to decide.

At the time of writing, information concerning the nature of this incident is far too sketchy to draw any firm conclusions.  Hopefully the enquiry will reveal what actually happened and, more importantly, why it happened, so that those charged with the safety of crowds around the world can learn from this tragic incident.

At this point I have two observations I would like to share with you.

(1) What appears to be the situation a few hours after the incident?

Here’s what I know at the moment, based on as yet uncorroborated media reports:

• The Duisburg Love Parade reportedly attracted a crowd of 1.4 million people — this number has not confirmed by the authorities.
• The event began at 14:00 and took place in a former railway freight yard.
• The event has a single entry point, a tunnel located on Karl-Lehr Street. The tunnel is actually a highway underpass. Dimensions of the tunnel are not known, but photographs suggest that it is about 15m wide at the entrance.  Its depth is also unknown; one media report suggested that it was 600m long (Voice of America Online) and another suggested it was 100m long (Guardian).  Photographs I have seen suggest that the tunnel was very long and appears to be made up of several separate underpasses.
• Photographs appearing in the media also suggest that the crowd outside the mouth of the tunnel and inside the tunnel was enormous.  While it is difficult to get an accurate measurement from the available photographs, they suggest to me that the crowd density was well in excess of 4 people/m² and may have been in excess of 6 people/m².  From the photographs there also appears to be no crowd management officials in sight and the random nature of the crowd further suggests that there was little organisation or control in the dispersal of the crowd.  It is not clear when the photographs I have seen were taken, but I assume that they were just before the event or during the event.
• 19 people were killed in the incident and 340 people were injured.  It is not clear where the fatalities occurred.

I would emphasise again that the information at this stage is sketchy and there are many important details missing.  However, if the little information that is available proves to be correct, I would offer the following observations:

• A single entry point for an event of this magnitude is not a good idea.  Given the size of the crowds expected, a single entry point was bound to make crowd management more complex and difficult with implications for crowd safety.    
• I currently have to assume that there was also only a single way out of the event — the entry point.  If this is the case, again it is poor planning for the same reason that a single entry is not a good idea.  I would hope that other emergency exit points were available which the crowd could use in the event of an emergency, but this is currently unknown to me.
• Another issue with having a single entry/exit point is that it may have to support quite sizeable bi-directional flows as people arrive and leave the event.  If controlled bi-directional flow is planned, this further reduces the effective width of the opening, increasing potential crowd management issues associated with the single entry point.  If the bi-directional flow was not controlled, this could have led to chaotic situations within the tunnel, especially with large flows of people.  From observation of the tunnel layout, I can see no evidence that there was a controlled bi-directional flow environment e.g. barriers in the tunnel to segregate entering and exiting patrons.
• Having a tunnel, and such a long tunnel, as the only entry/exit point, when large crowds are expected is not a good idea for several reasons.  Perhaps the most significant is that it provides poor visual access to what is happening within the tunnel.  In certain circumstances this will potentially have a negative influence on the behaviour of the crowds as they cannot see what is happening further into the tunnel and so cannot perceive that a problem such as a blockage may have developed within or beyond the tunnel.  Indeed, if one end of the tunnel was closed by crowd management officials, as some reports suggests, it would have been extremely difficult for people within the tunnel, at the other end of the tunnel and approaching the entrance to the tunnel to know this and hence would persist in trying to enter the tunnel or continue moving along the tunnel.  Perhaps more importantly, if the crowd management officials cannot see what is happening within the tunnel, it is more difficult to detect a problem in its early stages, which makes diffusing a minor crowd event and preventing it from developing into a tragic event extremely difficult, if not impossible.  It even makes it difficult for crowd management officials to know with any degree of certainty the number of people within the tunnel.  This is potentially a recipe for disaster.
• From what I can see in the photographs of the crowds approaching the tunnel from the station end i.e. the entrance, there appears to be no attempt at managing this flow.  It appears that there was no attempt to meter or regulate the flow of people or to channel the flow of people into the entrance.  I assume that the same was happening at the other end of the tunnel i.e. the event end.  From the pictures I have seen, the approach to the tunnel appears to have been a ‘free for all’.  If a small number of people had been expected to utilise the exit e.g. if there had been a smaller crowd or more entrances/exits, it may not have been necessary to provide this type of crowd management at the entry to the tunnel.  However, for an event attracting an audience of 1.4 million with a single entrance/exit, I suggest such measures would have been essential. 

(2) Subtle blaming of the victims.

As soon as news of the incident in Duisburg began to hit the front pages of the world’s newspapers and websites, familiar terms such as “crowd panic” and “crowd stampede” began to be used to describe the tragic incident in Duisburg.   For example:

• “Stampede at German Love Parade festival kills 19”

BBC online news 25 July 2010
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10751899

• Sky News Headline live to air 25 July 2010 11:00

“Police in Germany have begun an investigation into how a stampede at a music festival left 19 people dead and nearly 350 others injured.  Panic broke out at yesterdays Love Parade event at the city of Duisburg where crowds of party goers tried to force their way through a narrow tunnel and were crushed.”

• “Stampede at German Music Festival Kills 19”

Voice of America News, 25 July 2010
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/europe/10-Killed-in-German-Techno-Parade-Panic-99171424.html

• “Officials said the deaths and injuries occurred when panic broke out among huge crowds in a roughly 600 meter long tunnel leading towards the day-long open air Love Parade festival in the German city of Duisburg.”
  Voice of America News, 25 July 2010 
• “A mass panic resulting in a stampede reportedly led to the deaths near a tunnel at the Love Parade electronic music festival in the western German city of Duisburg.”

The Sun 25 July 2010
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3067817/19-die-at-German-street-festival.html

• Love Parade stampede in Germany kills at least 18

Los Angeles Times 25 July 2020
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-germany-love-parade-20100725,0,2079922.story

• “10 killed in mass panic at Germany’s Love Parade”

Business Week.
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9H5HJ3G1.htm

• “At least 10 people were killed and another 15 injured when mass panic broke out Saturday in a tunnel at an annual celebration of techno music in western Germany.”

Business Week.
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9H5HJ3G1.htm

This is the typical media response, and of more concern, the typical first response from officials to fatal crowd incidents all around the world.  I don’t intend to discuss here the lack of understanding that the media, the public and officialdom have of words such as ‘panic’ and ‘stampede’.  Rather, I want to discuss the implications that using such phrases have on the public’s understanding of the event. 

While not directly stated, the implication conveyed when these types of phrases are used is that the incident was the fault of the victims, that it was their ‘unreasonable’ behaviour that caused or substantially contributed to the incident and resulted in the tragic loss of life.  Using such phrases is unhelpful, as it immediately diverts attention from other factors that may have contributed to or indeed been the root cause of the tragic event.  There are many other plausible explanations that may have contributed to this and similar tragedies that must be thoroughly investigated rather than go for the easy option of blaming the behaviour of the crowds.  For example, event planners may have designed an environment (both the physical space and the crowd management systems) that was unsafe for the size of crowds that were expected; approval authorities, charged with ensuring event design and crowd management provision is fit for purpose, may have failed to identify potential problems with the proposed event design and crowd management provision; and finally on-ground crowd management officials, charged with the safety of the public may have been unable to safely manage the crowd or may have allowed dangerous conditions to develop. 

It is all too easy to use these phrases when describing tragic crowd incidents, and thereby pass the blame for the incident onto the victims. In my experience of these types of incidents, it is seldom the victims who are the root cause of the incident, but failures during planning, approval and management of the event.

Keep Safe

Prof Ed Galea, 25 July 2010, 14:00