The latest reports from South Korea now suggest that of the 476 people on board the Sewol, 174 were rescued, 159 bodies have been recovered and 143 people are still missing.

BLAME GAME:

It is human nature to want to blame someone after a tragedy.  But when a disaster of this magnitude occurs, it is time for a nation as a whole to reflect on its safety culture, and not simply blame a few individuals. We should be looking at the safety culture on board the Sewol, in the company that owns and runs the vessel, within the South Korean maritime industry and within South Korean culture as a whole.  It is far too easy to point a finger at a few people, as the South Korean President has done.  To address the real problem and ensure that this type of disaster never happens again, we must identify and address the root cause(s) of the problem and this is likely to be the result of a number of factors, beyond the immediate actions of the Captain and crew.

PREVIOUS DISASTERS:

To put this disaster into context it is useful to compare it to two other Ro-Ro ferries that have capsized in recent history resulting in large loss of life. In 1987 the Herald of Free Enterprise rolled over shortly after leaving port due to her bow doors being opened in less than 4 minutes and claimed the lives of 94 people while in 1994 the Estonia capsized in rough seas within about 15 minutes and claimed the lives of some 850 people.  So Ro-Ro vessels such as the Herald of Free Enterprise, Estonia and Sewol can capsize very rapidly if water gets onto the large open car decks.

HOW MUCH TIME WAS AVAILABLE?:

We believe that the crew of the Sewol first called the coast guard (CG) at 08:56 to say that they were in distress – however, it is not clear how long they waited after realising that they were in trouble before called the CG. It was reported today that the first call to the authorities was actually made by one of the children on board as he was frightened that the ship would sink.  This is believed to be some 3 minutes before the crew made their first call.

From the official transcripts: 

9:10 a.m.

Sewol: Jindo VTS, this is Sewol

Jindo Coastal VTS: This is Jindo Coastal VTS.

Sewol: We’re tilted, so it looks like we’ll flip over soon.

Jindo Coastal VTS: Okay. How are the people on board? Boat A is nearing your boat as fast as possible.

Sewol: We’re so tilted that (we) can hardly move.

9:17 a.m.

Jindo Coastal VTS: Sewol, do you read Jindo Coastal VTS? (four times). How flooded are you?

Sewol: With the boat now tilted at least 50 degrees to the left, people can’t move to their left or right. The crew have been told to wait with their life jackets on. But it’s impossible to check whether they’re actually wearing them. Crew members gathered on the bridge are unable to move. Please hurry up.

So at 09:10 (some 14 minutes after first official message to the CG) they state that the vessel was severely leaning over, but no firm indication as to the degree of heel apart from saying they can hardly move. At 09:17 they estimate that they are on a heel of about 50 degrees, this is some 21 minutes after the crew first contacted the CG and some 24 minutes after the child made his call.

So the vessel appears to have a severe list some 14 to 21 minutes after the crew first radioed the CG to inform them of their emergency. We do not know how long it took them to radio the CG after the incident began, but it appears to be some 3 minutes after the child on board made his call. So it appears that they may have had around 17 minutes (or more) before conditions on the vessel became very difficult.

It will be important to establish when the crew first attempted to contact the passengers and when the message to “stay where you are” was made.

Given that around 17 minutes may have been available before conditions deteriorated to the point that movement became almost impossible, it is unlikely that all 476 souls on board the Sewol would have been able to reach the assembly points from which they could relatively easily abandon the vessel.  Nevertheless, had a command to commence the assembly phase been given at the earliest possible time, it is likely that considerably more of those on board could have been able to reach the assembly stations and therefore been in a position to abandon the vessel.

SAFETY CULTURE:

Given that there appears to have been sufficient time to allow a greater number of people to evacuate from the Sewol, it is important to establish the following: what were the evacuation procedures? How well did the crew know and understand them? What prevented the crew from implementing them?

These questions allude to the safety culture on the Sewol, in the management company, and in wider South Korean society, particularly:

• What were the evacuation procedures on the Sewol?
  • How appropriate were these procedures for a Ro-Ro ferry?
• Are passengers routinely informed of the evacuation procedures prior to departure?
  • How are they informed?
• How familiar were the Captain and crew with their own evacuation procedures?
  • How often did the Captain and crew drill their evacuation procedures?
  • What did the evacuation drill consist of?
  • What was considered acceptable performance in evacuation drills and does this demonstrate an appropriate level of competence and understanding?
• What oversight of the evacuation procedures did the parent company of the Sewol have?
• What oversight of the evacuation training did the parent company of the Sewol have?
• Did the corporate culture encourage or discourage adherence to safety and evacuation procedures?
• What oversight of the evacuation procedures did the Korean maritime authorities have?
• What oversight of the evacuation training did the Korean maritime authorities have?

Similar questions could be asked relating to other operational issues such as those relating to the safe navigation of the vessel, loading and securing cargo and rescue operations.

• Comments on the Costa Concordia Grounding 13 January 2012. Part 1 The Ship Evacuation Process.  http://fseg.gre.ac.uk/blog/?p=110
• Comments on the Costa Concordia Grounding 13 January 2012. Part 2 What do we currently know about the Costa Concordia Incident. http://fseg.gre.ac.uk/blog/?p=117
• Comments on the Costa Concordia Grounding 13 January 2012. Part 3 Repercussions for Passenger Ship Safety. http://fseg.gre.ac.uk/blog/?p=126

Here I would like to attempt to put together a picture of what we currently know about the Sewol disaster based on current media accounts and make some tentative comments about the possible cause of the incident.  In later blogs we will explore the implications of this incident on passenger safety.

As is the case after every disaster, the world’s media has been flooded with accounts concerning the sinking of the Sewol.   There is so much information flying about it is difficult to keep track of the salient points of the incident.  Here is what I hope a summary of some of the reported key points:

The vessel:

• The Sewol was built by Hayashikane Shipbuilding & Engineering in Nagasaki, Japan in 1994.
• The Sewol is a Ro-Ro ferry.  She has passenger accommodation on the upper decks and a car deck lower down on the vessel.  The vessel has a vehicle ramp in the aft of the vessel.  The vessel can also carry shipping containers.
• Vessel was bought by South Korea in October 2012.
• It is owned by Chonghaejin Marine and the vessel is registered with the Korean Register of Shipping
• The Sewoll was modified from Oct 2012 to Feb 2013.  It is reported that additional accommodation space was added to the third, fourth and fifth decks to accommodate 181 additional passengers (some reports say 117 passengers and some reports also say additional cargo capacity) and that the existing cabin spaces were also modified.  It is reported that the modifications added 239 tons of weight to the vessel (some reports suggest 169 tonnes).
• The Sewol is reported to have passed all required certification and safety checks following modification.
• At the time of her last sailing, the Sewol was 146m long, 22m wide with a gross tonnage of 7000 tons. It could accommodate 921 passengers, 35 crew and space for 220 vehicles.  It could also carry 152 20 foot shipping containers. It had a reported maximum speed of 21 knots.
• The vessel is reported to have 46 lifeboats, but this probably means 46 liferafts.  From the available photographs it is not clear if there are any davet lunched lifeboats.
• On its final voyage it is reported that it was carrying more than 100 cars and lorries, along with a sizable shipment of cargo containers strapped onto the deck.
• Detailed plans of the vessel, showing the layout of the interior and the location of the assembly errors are not available.

From BBC News website http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-27087243

The occupants:

• Reports of the total number of people on board during her final sailing varies from 359 up to 476.
• The lower estimate is made up of: 30 crew, 325 students, 15 teachers and 89 other passengers.  However, at the time of writing it is not known precisely how many people were on board.
• Most accounts agree on the number of students at 325.
• Students are from Danwon High School in Ansan, a suburb of Seoul

The voyage:

• She was on a routine voyage which she usually undertakes two or three times per week.
• The route runs from Incheon to the tourist island of Jeju.
• The voyage is reported to last 13.5 hours (some reports say 14 hours).
• On its last voyage, the Sewol sets sail from Incheon on Tuesday 15 April at night.
• The conditions are reported as calm with a water temperature of about 12^OC at the time of the incident.
• It is expected that the passengers do not undertake an assembly drill prior to departure as the voyage is under 24 hours in duration.  Thus by IMO regulations the shipping company is not required to hold an assembly drill.

The incident:

• It is alleged that the Captain (68 year old Lee Joon-Seok) was not on the bridge at the time of the incident.  This in itself is not an issue as the Captain cannot be expected to be on the bridge at all times.  However, the question is whether or not this was a time requiring the Captain to be pilot the vessel.
• It is alleged that the third mate, a 26 year old woman with one year’s experience at the helm of a vessel and five months experience on the Sewol is at the helm.  It is alleged that this was the first time she had the helm of the Sewol.
• It is alleged that the vessel made a sharp turn between 08:48 and 08:49. It is not clear why the sharp turn was made.
• Passengers report hearing a bang and feeling a sever jolt.
• A distress call is made from the Sewol at 08:56 (23:56 GMT) on Wednesday 16 April, vessel begins to heel over.
• At around 09:30 the Sewol is at 60⁰ heel and helicopters begin arriving.
• At around 09:45 helicopters begin rescue operations.
• At around 10:00 vessel is at 90^O heel rescue operations continue.
• At around 10:23 vessel is completely overturned.
• During this period passengers report that they were instructed to remain where they were.
• At the time of writing it is alleged that 46 people are confirmed dead, 174 rescued and 256 are missing.
• Of the suggested 29 crew members on board, 20 including the Captain survived.  It is alleged that the Captain was amongst the first to board rescue boats.  Note that this does not mean that he was amongst the first rescued as helicopters allegedly rescued the first people.

From the Straits Times Web site: http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/east-asia/story/south-korea-ferry-disaster-fury-and-questions-grip

Speculation:

There are at least three possible causes for the incident:

1)    The vessel hits an obstruction on the sea bed ripping open a hole in the vessel which suddenly takes on water causing the severe heel.  The bang heard by the passengers was the sound of the vessel hitting the obstruction.

• As this is a regular voyage on a regular route it is unlikely that the vessel would hit an obstruction on the sea bed unless the vessel was off course at the time of the incident.
• The rescue divers may be able to eliminate option 1 if they are able to examine the hull of the submerged vessel.

2)    The sudden turn made by the vessel is beyond the normal operational parameters of the vessel for the loading conditions causing the cargo to become dislodged

3)    The sudden turn made by the vessel causes the vessel to lean into the turn destabilising the cargo and vehicles on the car deck which in turn accentuates the heel.  The bang heard by the passengers is the shifting cargo on the vessel.

• This may be an issue if the modifications to the vessel made the vessel less stable at normal operating situations by raising the centre of gravity of the vessel.
• Alternatively, the cargo may have been incorrectly secured to the deck so that a sudden turn could have dislodged the cargo.

As in most disasters of this type, so soon after the incident, information concerning the nature of this incident is far too sketchy to draw any firm conclusions. Indeed, at the time of writing there are more questions than answers. Hopefully the inquiry into this incident will reveal what happened and why it happened. It is hoped that from this tragic incident lessons will be learned that will lead to the improved safety of those who take to the sea.