The BBC headline on their website for this story states,

 Glasgow Airport evacuation: Passenger tells of panic on Jet2 plane

 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-20001291

Is this a fair account of the situation on board the Jet2 aircraft?  Were people really behaving irrationally and in a selfish manner during this evacuation?  Had social norms broken down, was it everyone for themselves?  Or is this just another media exaggeration to sensationalise a story?

Other media accounts had more factual headlines, such as from the Express web site:

17 Injured as plane is evacuated at Glasgow Airport after smoke alert.

http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/353053/17-injured-as-plane-is-evacuated-at-Glasgow-Airport-after-smoke-alert

From the Telegraph web site we have:

Glasgow Airport Seventeen injured as aircraft aborts take off

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/aviation/9619600/Glasgow-Airport-Seventeen-injured-as-aircraft-aborts-take-off.html

From the Mail Online web site we have:

20 crew and passengers are INJURED in emergency evacuation by inflatable slides from jet at Glasgow airport after “engine” fills cabin with smoke.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2220041/17-injured-crew-passengers-evacuated-plane-Glasgow-Airport.html?ITO=1490

Evacuating an aircraft is not something that people do every day, and so it is going to be an unusual experience for most people, and a frightening experience for most, especially if you believe, as these people must have, that a fire had started on board.  All 189 passengers will also have to exit the aircraft in an awful hurry and in an unusual and physical manner i.e. jumping onto slides or climbing out of the overwing exit, onto the wing and then jump to the ground.  The cabin crew will have been yelling at the passengers to evacuate, leave your bags, jump onto the slide, while the cabin was filling with acrid smoke.  The passengers on board would have been a mix of people including;  men, women, children, the elderly, family groups and possibly disabled people.  They would have had a range of flying experience from frequent flyers to the ocassional  flyer.  Given this mix of people we would not expect everyone to react in the same way, and not everyone will react without emotion.  But will panic really break out in this situation, will it be everyone for themselves, as the BBC headline suggests?

The opening sentence of the BBC article may give this impression,

 “Passengers on an Alicante-bound plane from Glasgow Airport have described “sheer panic” after “swirling” smoke in the cabin forced an emergency stop.” 

So what do the BBC base this on?  A quote from one passenger was reported as,

“… passenger X said “people started running” as the pilot of the Jet2 737 shouted “get out, get out” following the emergency stop at 07:40.”….”

Well this seems quite normal given the situation, who wouldn’t be trying to run out of an aircraft filling with smoke with the captain and cabin crew yelling at you to get out!  Indeed, you would be in a panicked state if you just froze on the spot and didn’t do anything — this is called negative panic or behavioural inaction.  It is a normal behaviour to try and get out of the aircraft as quickly as possible, especially if the captain and cabin crew are yelling at you to get out!

The BBC inform us that one passenger was travelling with his young family and report the passenger as saying, 

 “I have a nine-week-old daughter and a four-year-old daughter. I had my nine-week-old attached to my chest as I went down the emergency chute and my wife had our four-year-old and was in tears. ……. It was just sheer panic, something no-one would want to go through again.”

Clearly this situation is extremely frightening and traumatic, especially if you have a wife, child and infant to look after, make your way to the emergency exit and then jump onto a slide — all while the other 185 passengers are trying to get out and the aircraft is filling with smoke.  It is not surprising that there were tears and it is not surprising that they would have been extremely anxious and would have had adrenaline pumping.  But the behaviour of this family does not sound like a panic behaviour.  They kept together and assisted each other out of the aircraft.  Their behaviour sounds like a rational response to the extra ordinary situation that they found themselves in.  While the passenger uses the “P” word in his description it would have been helpful had the journalist gone on to ask the passenger to describe the scenes of panic that he reported.  Often people will use the “P” word to describe people running away from danger, or people crying.  This does not indicate that people were behaving in an irrational manner or that social norms are ignored.

The BBC also selectively quote another passenger’s account in their article and also helpfully include a recording of the interview.  In the article the passenger is reported as saying,

“I was sitting in row 11 and I could smell smoke as we were accelerating hard. “I looked up. One or two passengers, including myself, had our reading light on and when I looked up to the lamps and the ceiling, I could actually see smoke swirling around and I thought, oops, there’s something not right here.  “We were accelerating very, very hard down the runway at this stage and I was about to scream out to the cabin crew when obviously the pilot realised there was something wrong and he immediately throttled the engines back and put the brakes on. “It’s the hardest braking I’ve ever experienced in my life.” 

This is where the BBC article leaves the interview.  This selective quotation fits into the tone of the story that is being told by the journalist, smoke filling the aircraft and the dramatic stop.  However, in the recorded interview, which is also available on the BBC website, the passenger goes on to say, but is not quoted in the article,

“….a few seconds later he gave the order to evacuate. Everybody got out of their seats, one or two passengers tried to reach into the overhead lockers to get their baggage but they were politely told in no uncertain Glaswegian terms just get out of the aircraft” both the journalist and the passenger laugh, “leave your bags and get out, but there was no panic”.

The passenger is describing an orderly behaviour and makes the observation that there was no panic.  This unfortunately does not fit into the tone of the article and so is not reported.  The journalist desperately tries to get back to possible stories of panic and extreme behaviour and goes onto to say,

“You are laughing about it now but that is probably not what you were feeling about it at the time.”

 The passenger (helpfully) responds,

 “..There was smoke coming off the right hand engine so I was going out the left overwing exit….we all wanted to get off as quickly as possible but it was all orderly, there was no panic.”

In describing his own behaviour the passenger paints a picture of rational behaviour, a clear thought process that lead him to select an appropriate exit.  He also describes the behaviour of others as being orderly and states that there was no panic.  Clearly this account does not fit with the tone of the article so it is not reported.  The journalist rather go with the easy story, the story that is going to make a sensationalist headline, the story that is in-line with the publics hollywood feed expectations when it comes to evacuation stories — people panic!

While these two accounts are not sufficient to base a judgement on the nature of the evacuation from the Jet2 aircraft, they certainly do not support the BBC headline or the tone of the BBC story.  I am sure that there were people screaming and crying during the evacuation, but this in itself is not an indication of panic behaviour.  Indeed, the accounts in the BBC story support the understanding built up over the past 30+ years that on the whole people do not tend to panic in emergency situations.  Indeed, quite the opposite, people tend to behave in a rational way and social norms are maintained even in the most extreme situations.

Unfortunately, this story simply perpetuates the myth that in emergency situations the norm is for people to panic.  I think that a more interesting, uplifting story is that in emergency situations people tend not to panic, but tend to behave in a rational supportive manner and are more likely to assist others then selfishly think only of themselves.

The Jet2 aircraft after the evacuation (picture from ITV website)

Come and visit the EXODUS demo stand and check out our most recent research which will be presented through 7 papers:

“Fire and Evacuation Simulation of the Fatal 1985 Manchester Airport B737 Fire”, Wang, Z., Jia, F., and Galea, E.R.

ABSTRACT:

In this paper, fire and evacuation computer simulations are conducted to determine the impact of exit opening times on the evacuation and survivability during the Manchester Airport B737 fire of 1985. The fire and evacuation simulation tools, SMARTFIRE and airEXODUS are used in the analysis. The work is in two parts, the first part attempts to reconstruct the actual fire incident and ensuing evacuation using the known facts derived from the official investigation report.  The second part investigates the impact of exit opening times on the aircraft fire development and subsequent evacuation. The results suggest that the number of fatalities could have been reduced by 92% had the delays in opening two of the three exits been avoided.  Furthermore, it is suggested that opening of the unused aft right exit during the accident did not contribute to the high loss of life in this accident.  Indeed, it is suggested that the opening of this exit improved survivability within the cabin and reduced the death toll by some 17%.

“Investigating the impact of culture on evacuation behaviour — A Polish Data-Set”, Galea, E.R., Sharp, G., Sauter, M., Deere, S.J., Filippidis, L.
ABSTRACT:

In this paper results from an unannounced evacuation trial conducted within a library inWarsawPolandare presented and discussed. This experimental evacuation is part of a large international study investigating the impact of culture on evacuation behaviour. In addition, a framework to enable the systematic analysis of Response Phase behaviours is presented and applied to the trial data. The framework not only provides a consistent method for describing Response Phase behaviour, but also provides a framework for classifying and quantifying the Response Phase other than simply using the overall response time. An empirical response time model, based on data generated using the framework is also presented and applied to the evacuation trial data. The empirical response time model produces a prediction for the average response time for the trial population which is within 3% of the measured value. In addition to presenting Response Phase data, a data-set suitable for the validation of evacuation models is also presented. This consists of both egress times and time dependent density measurements.  buildingEXODUS predictions of the evacuation are compared with the validation data and shown to be in good agreement with the measured data.

“Modelling Human Factors and Evacuation Lift Dispatch Strategies”, Kinsey, M.J., Galea, E.R., and Lawrence, P.J.

ABSTRACT:

This paper presents an overview of a series of evacuation simulations utilising different lift dispatch strategies using an empirical based enhanced agent-lift model developed within the buildingEXODUS software. A brief description of the enhanced agent-lift model is presented. The evacuation scenarios investigated are based on a hypothetical 50 floor building with four staircases and a population of 7,840 agents. While past studies have measured the influence of such evacuation lift dispatch strategies assuming compliant/homogenous agent behaviour, this study extends that work by highlighting the potential influence of human factors upon such evacuation lift dispatch strategies. The study suggests that evacuation lift human factors can considerably decrease evacuation performance and highlights the need for consideration within evacuation strategies based on lifts.  

“An Analysis of the Performance of Trained Staff Using Movement Assist Devices To Evacuate the Non-Ambulant”, Hunt, A., Galea E.R., and Lawrence, P.J.
ABSTRACT:

This paper describes a series of trials undertaken to quantify the performance of trained hospital staff in evacuating a test subject through 11 floors of Ghent University Hospital using four commonly used movement assistance devices: stretcher, carry-chair, evacuation chair and rescue sheet.  In total 32 trials were conducted, using both male and female assist teams.  Presented in the paper are performance results, including: device preparation time, horizontal speeds, vertical speeds, and overtaking potential in stairwells. These data, alongside those established in questionnaire data from the experiment participants, form the basis of the device performance evaluation presented in this paper. A comparative methodology is derived to assess the efficiency of the devices. This methodology enabled performance differences to be established, according to the devices employed and the staff involved.
 

“The UK BeSeCu Fire Fighter Study: A Study of UK Fire Fighters’ Emotional, Cognitive and Behavioural Reactions to Emergencies”, Hulse, L.M. and Galea, E.R.
ABSTRACT:

A survey of UK firefighters revealed them to be seemingly psychologically prepared for what their job would expose them to but not immune to experiencing emotional arousal or perceived risk during emergency events. A number of aspects, such as the event posing serious consequences to their lives/well-being, were singled out as particularly distressing and linked with greater emotional arousal, while other aspects, ones focused on other people/circumstances, reduced perceived risk. Traffic accidents appeared to be a special case, inducing lower arousal and risk than another commonly attended emergency, domestic fires. More years of service had a positive effect on the risk perceived during a stressful event but heightened the emotional arousal in that moment. Received support was one of the most significant predictors of posttraumatic stress and growth, as well as being significantly linked to peri-event thoughts/feelings, although other variables not tested here, e.g. individual differences, might be better at explaining posttraumatic states than event-related variables. The sample reported that safety work with a risk group, migrants, was underway and appeared to be beneficial in reducing instances of “inappropriate behaviour” during emergencies but communication difficulties were an issue and training on this matter would appear desirable. Significant differences in responses across the UK were detected and consequences for international comparisons are discussed.
 

“The Collection and Analysis of Data from a Fatal Large-Scale Crowd Incident”, Pretorius, M., Gwynne, S., and Galea, E.R.
ABSTRACT:

This paper discusses the analysis of data-sets from observations made at the Duisburg Love Parade in 2010 and the large-scale crowd situation that ended in fatalities due to the development of crush conditions. This event is a useful case study of large crowd circulation based on the materialthat was made publically available by the organisers and attendees. The resultant data-set has been used to configure the buildingEXODUS modelto approximate the original incident in order to verify both the model’s performance and the underlying scenario assumptions; i.e. whether buildingEXODUS can reliably represent agent actions, the conditions that develop and the impact of these developments.
 

“Response Time Data for Large Passenger Ferries and Cruise Ships”, Brown, R., Galea, E.R., Deere, S., and Filippidis, L.

ABSTRACT:

This paper outlines research that was carried-out under the EU FP7 7 project SAFEGUARD and presents three sets of passenger response time data generated from full-scale semi-unannounced assembly trials at sea.  The data sets were generated from two different types of passenger ships, a RO-PAX ferry, SuperSpeed 1 (SS1) and a cruise ship, Jewel of the Seas (JoS).  In total response times from over 2200 people were collected making it the largest response time data set ever collected — on land or sea.  The paper presents the analysis methodology used to extract the response time data and the resultant response time distributions (RTD).  A number of key findings from the data analysis will also be presented, which includes: (a) all generated RTDs are log-normal, (b) RTDs from the two SS1 trials using two different populations are very similar, (c) The combined RTD for the SS1 is almost identical to the RTD generated from the earlier published data for the same type of vessel, (d) The RTD derived for the public spaces on the JoS is significantly different to that of the SS1, (e) The RTD for public spaces and cabins are significantly different.  These findings are discussed in this paper and form the basis of a recommendation to be submitted to the International Maritime Organisation to be used to frame the next iteration of the international guidelines for ship evacuation analysis.

http://www.youtube.com/FSEGresearch/

As in most disasters of this type, so soon after the incident, information concerning the nature of this incident is far too sketchy to draw any firm conclusions. Indeed, at the time of writing there are more questions than answers. Hopefully the inquiry into this incident will reveal what happened and why it happened. It is hoped that from this tragic incident lessons will be learned that will lead to the improved safety of those who take to the sea.

• Don’t start your own bonfire, safest way to enjoy the festivities is to go to an organised display.
• If you are going to set off your own fireworks remember:
  • Only buy fireworks marked BS 7114.
  • Don’t drink alcohol if setting off fireworks.
  • Store fireworks in a closed box; make sure the lid is firmly closed.
  • Have a bucket of water handy.
  • Make sure you have a torch with you.
  • Light fireworks at arm’s length with a taper.
  • Never go near a firework that has been lit.  Even if it hasn’t gone off, it could still explode.
  • Never put fireworks in your pocket.
  • Never throw fireworks — this is illegal and you could get a fine of up to UK£5000!
  • Always supervise children around fireworks.
  • Light sparklers one at a time and wear gloves.
  • Never give sparklers to a child under five.
  • Keep pets indoors.

Have fun!

At the time of writing, information concerning the nature of this incident is far too sketchy to draw any firm conclusions.  Hopefully the enquiry will reveal what actually happened and, more importantly, why it happened, so that those charged with the safety of crowds around the world can learn from this tragic incident.

At this point I have two observations I would like to share with you.

(1) What appears to be the situation a few hours after the incident?

Here’s what I know at the moment, based on as yet uncorroborated media reports:

• The Duisburg Love Parade reportedly attracted a crowd of 1.4 million people — this number has not confirmed by the authorities.
• The event began at 14:00 and took place in a former railway freight yard.
• The event has a single entry point, a tunnel located on Karl-Lehr Street. The tunnel is actually a highway underpass. Dimensions of the tunnel are not known, but photographs suggest that it is about 15m wide at the entrance.  Its depth is also unknown; one media report suggested that it was 600m long (Voice of America Online) and another suggested it was 100m long (Guardian).  Photographs I have seen suggest that the tunnel was very long and appears to be made up of several separate underpasses.
• Photographs appearing in the media also suggest that the crowd outside the mouth of the tunnel and inside the tunnel was enormous.  While it is difficult to get an accurate measurement from the available photographs, they suggest to me that the crowd density was well in excess of 4 people/m² and may have been in excess of 6 people/m².  From the photographs there also appears to be no crowd management officials in sight and the random nature of the crowd further suggests that there was little organisation or control in the dispersal of the crowd.  It is not clear when the photographs I have seen were taken, but I assume that they were just before the event or during the event.
• 19 people were killed in the incident and 340 people were injured.  It is not clear where the fatalities occurred.

I would emphasise again that the information at this stage is sketchy and there are many important details missing.  However, if the little information that is available proves to be correct, I would offer the following observations:

• A single entry point for an event of this magnitude is not a good idea.  Given the size of the crowds expected, a single entry point was bound to make crowd management more complex and difficult with implications for crowd safety.    
• I currently have to assume that there was also only a single way out of the event — the entry point.  If this is the case, again it is poor planning for the same reason that a single entry is not a good idea.  I would hope that other emergency exit points were available which the crowd could use in the event of an emergency, but this is currently unknown to me.
• Another issue with having a single entry/exit point is that it may have to support quite sizeable bi-directional flows as people arrive and leave the event.  If controlled bi-directional flow is planned, this further reduces the effective width of the opening, increasing potential crowd management issues associated with the single entry point.  If the bi-directional flow was not controlled, this could have led to chaotic situations within the tunnel, especially with large flows of people.  From observation of the tunnel layout, I can see no evidence that there was a controlled bi-directional flow environment e.g. barriers in the tunnel to segregate entering and exiting patrons.
• Having a tunnel, and such a long tunnel, as the only entry/exit point, when large crowds are expected is not a good idea for several reasons.  Perhaps the most significant is that it provides poor visual access to what is happening within the tunnel.  In certain circumstances this will potentially have a negative influence on the behaviour of the crowds as they cannot see what is happening further into the tunnel and so cannot perceive that a problem such as a blockage may have developed within or beyond the tunnel.  Indeed, if one end of the tunnel was closed by crowd management officials, as some reports suggests, it would have been extremely difficult for people within the tunnel, at the other end of the tunnel and approaching the entrance to the tunnel to know this and hence would persist in trying to enter the tunnel or continue moving along the tunnel.  Perhaps more importantly, if the crowd management officials cannot see what is happening within the tunnel, it is more difficult to detect a problem in its early stages, which makes diffusing a minor crowd event and preventing it from developing into a tragic event extremely difficult, if not impossible.  It even makes it difficult for crowd management officials to know with any degree of certainty the number of people within the tunnel.  This is potentially a recipe for disaster.
• From what I can see in the photographs of the crowds approaching the tunnel from the station end i.e. the entrance, there appears to be no attempt at managing this flow.  It appears that there was no attempt to meter or regulate the flow of people or to channel the flow of people into the entrance.  I assume that the same was happening at the other end of the tunnel i.e. the event end.  From the pictures I have seen, the approach to the tunnel appears to have been a ‘free for all’.  If a small number of people had been expected to utilise the exit e.g. if there had been a smaller crowd or more entrances/exits, it may not have been necessary to provide this type of crowd management at the entry to the tunnel.  However, for an event attracting an audience of 1.4 million with a single entrance/exit, I suggest such measures would have been essential. 

(2) Subtle blaming of the victims.

As soon as news of the incident in Duisburg began to hit the front pages of the world’s newspapers and websites, familiar terms such as “crowd panic” and “crowd stampede” began to be used to describe the tragic incident in Duisburg.   For example:

• “Stampede at German Love Parade festival kills 19”

BBC online news 25 July 2010
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10751899

• Sky News Headline live to air 25 July 2010 11:00

“Police in Germany have begun an investigation into how a stampede at a music festival left 19 people dead and nearly 350 others injured.  Panic broke out at yesterdays Love Parade event at the city of Duisburg where crowds of party goers tried to force their way through a narrow tunnel and were crushed.”

• “Stampede at German Music Festival Kills 19”

Voice of America News, 25 July 2010
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/europe/10-Killed-in-German-Techno-Parade-Panic-99171424.html

• “Officials said the deaths and injuries occurred when panic broke out among huge crowds in a roughly 600 meter long tunnel leading towards the day-long open air Love Parade festival in the German city of Duisburg.”
  Voice of America News, 25 July 2010 
• “A mass panic resulting in a stampede reportedly led to the deaths near a tunnel at the Love Parade electronic music festival in the western German city of Duisburg.”

The Sun 25 July 2010
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3067817/19-die-at-German-street-festival.html

• Love Parade stampede in Germany kills at least 18

Los Angeles Times 25 July 2020
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-germany-love-parade-20100725,0,2079922.story

• “10 killed in mass panic at Germany’s Love Parade”

Business Week.
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9H5HJ3G1.htm

• “At least 10 people were killed and another 15 injured when mass panic broke out Saturday in a tunnel at an annual celebration of techno music in western Germany.”

Business Week.
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9H5HJ3G1.htm

This is the typical media response, and of more concern, the typical first response from officials to fatal crowd incidents all around the world.  I don’t intend to discuss here the lack of understanding that the media, the public and officialdom have of words such as ‘panic’ and ‘stampede’.  Rather, I want to discuss the implications that using such phrases have on the public’s understanding of the event. 

While not directly stated, the implication conveyed when these types of phrases are used is that the incident was the fault of the victims, that it was their ‘unreasonable’ behaviour that caused or substantially contributed to the incident and resulted in the tragic loss of life.  Using such phrases is unhelpful, as it immediately diverts attention from other factors that may have contributed to or indeed been the root cause of the tragic event.  There are many other plausible explanations that may have contributed to this and similar tragedies that must be thoroughly investigated rather than go for the easy option of blaming the behaviour of the crowds.  For example, event planners may have designed an environment (both the physical space and the crowd management systems) that was unsafe for the size of crowds that were expected; approval authorities, charged with ensuring event design and crowd management provision is fit for purpose, may have failed to identify potential problems with the proposed event design and crowd management provision; and finally on-ground crowd management officials, charged with the safety of the public may have been unable to safely manage the crowd or may have allowed dangerous conditions to develop. 

It is all too easy to use these phrases when describing tragic crowd incidents, and thereby pass the blame for the incident onto the victims. In my experience of these types of incidents, it is seldom the victims who are the root cause of the incident, but failures during planning, approval and management of the event.

Keep Safe

Prof Ed Galea, 25 July 2010, 14:00